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FORCED MARRIAGE: TERMINOLOGICAL COHERENCE AND 
DISSONANCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
Valerie Oosterveld• 
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has charged two 
accused, Dominic Ongwen and Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz, with forced marriage 
as the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts. 1 Ongwen, a former senior 
leader and brigade commander in the Lord's Resistance Armr in northern Uganda, 
is charged with directly committing and having responsibility for a system of "forced 
exclusive conjugal partners" under which abducted girls and women were compelled 
to serve as "wives" within his brigade during the 2002-2005 time period. 3 AI Hassan, 
the former de facto chief of the Islamic police under armed groups Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Dine, is charged with participating in a policy of forced 
marriages which victimized the female inhabitants ofTimbuktu, Mali, in 2012-2013, 
and led to repeated rapes and sexual enslavement of these women and girls. 4 These 
charges broke new ground for the ICC, which had never before laid charges explic-
itly focused on forced marriage. s 
These charges build upon developments at two other international(ized) criminal 
tribunals: the Special Court for Sierra Leone (the "Special Court" or SCSL) and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). 6 The Special Court 
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1 Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges against Dominic Ongwen (Pre-Trial Chamber li Mar. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Ongwen 
ConfrrmationofCharges]; Prosecutorv. AI Hassan, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/18, Warrant of 
Arrest for AI Hassan Ag Abdou! Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud (Pre-Trial Chamber I 
Mar. 27, 2018) [hereinafter A1 Hassan Arrest Warrant]. 
2 Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, supra note 1, ~ I. 
3 Id 1Mf104--17, 136--38. 
4 A1 Hassan Arrest Warrant, supra note 1, 1M[ 5-7, 9, 12. 
' The ICC had, however, considered evidence offorced marriage under the charge of 
sexual slavery. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirma-
tion of Charges, ~ 431 (Pre-Trial Chamber I Sept. 3 0, 2008). 
6 The Special Cowt for Sierra Leone is considered to be an "international" criminal tribunal. 
See Prosecutorv. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14/15/16-AR72(E), Decision on Constitution-
ality and Lack of Jurisdiction, 1Mf49-52 (Appeals Chamber Mar. 13, 2004) (explaining that 
the Special Cowt "is established outside the national court system" and "is not anchored in any 
existing system''); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity 
from Jurisdiction, 1Mf37-42 (Appeals Chamber May 31, 2004) ("[T]he Special Court was 
established to fulfil an international mandate and is part ofthe machinery of international 
justice.''). The Special Court was provided with international legal personality. See Agreement 
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was the flrst international court to enter convictions of forced marriage as a type of 
crime against humanity.7 In its judgments, the Special Court concluded that, during 
the armed conflict in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, a large number of civilian women 
and girls were forced to serve as so-called "bush wives" to rebel forces within a 
widespread and organized system of slavery. 8 These girls and women were expected 
to submit to rape as demanded by their "husbands," do domestic chores, porter their 
husband's belongings, and bear and rear any children conceived from their rapes.9 
The Special Court convicted leaders of a rebel group for their participation in a joint 
criminal enterprise which supported this system of forced marriage. 10 
Following the example set by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the ECCC also 
convicted individuals for their participation in a joint criminal enterprise which 
carried out a nationwide policy of forced marriage. 11 The ECCC found that, during 
the 1975-1979 reign of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, men and women-often 
strangers--were forced to marry as part of the ruling party's attempts to implement 
the "great leap forward" in the regime's socialist revolution. 12 The forcibly married 
individuals were pressured to have sex and produce children. 13 
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a 
SpecialCourtforSierraLeoneart.ll(d),Jan.16,2002, 2178U.N.T.S. 138 (granting the Special 
Court the ''judicial capacity necessary to" "[ e ]nter into agreements with States as may be 
necessary for the exercise of its functions and for the operation of the Court') (entered into 
force Apr. 12, 2002). The ECCC refers to itself as an ''internationalized" criminal tribunal be-
cause it is a "Cambodian court with international elements." Is the ECCC a Cambodian or an 
International Court?, Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (July 20, 2017), 
https:/ /www.eccc.gov .kh/en/faq/eccc-cambodian-or-international-court [https://perma.cc/XM 
9M-H5NW]. 
7 Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court 
Prosecutor Hails RUFConvictions (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press 
/OlP/prosecutor-022509. pdf [hereinafter RUF Trial Judgment Press Release]; Press Release, 
Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor Welcomes Convictions 
inRUF Appeals Judgment(Oct 26, 2009), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/prose 
cutor-102609.pdf [hereinafter RUF Appeals Judgment Press Release]. 
8 Prosecutorv. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T,Judgm.ent,, 1295 (Tria1Chamber1Mar.2, 
2009) [hereinafter RUF Trial Judgment]. See also SUSAN MCKAY & DYAN MAzuRANA, 
WHERE ARE 1HE GIRLS? GIRLS IN FIGHTING FORCES INNORTIIERN UGANDA, SIERRA LEONE 
AND MOZAMBIQUE: 1lmiR. LIVES DuRING AND AFrnR. WAR 92 (2004) (reporting that sixty 
percent of girl soldiers interviewed indicated that they had served as ''wives" to the Revolu-
tionary United Front combatants, or other fighting forces). 
9 RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, 'rn 460, 1154-55, 1211-13, 1293, 1295, 1413, 
1472. 
10 Id at 678, 682, 685. 
11 Prosecutor v. Nuon (Case 002/02), Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC!fC, Summary of 
Judgment in Case 002/02,,39, 51, 60 (Trial Chamber Nov. 16, 2018) [hereinafter Summary 
of Judgment in Case 002/02]. 
12 Id , 5-6, 39--40. 
13 Id , 39--40. 
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Interestingly, each tribunal has defined and understood forced marriage in a some-
what different manner. 14 Indeed, even within a tribunal, interpretations of forced 
marriage vmy.15 This Article examines the variances in perceptions of forced marriage 
as the crime against humanity of"other inhumane acts." It begins by describing how 
the first international criminal tribunal to consider forced marriage--the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone--approached the violation. 16 It further analyzes the Special Court's 
changing categorization of forced marriage.17 The Article then explores how the 
ECCC followed the Special Court's lead, but also incorporated more direct reference 
to international human rights law's approach to forced marriage.18 Finally, it recounts 
how the ICC has--to some extent-bridged the differences between the vmying in-
terpretations by bringing together the international criminal law definition of forced 
marriage set out by the Special Court's Appeals Chamber with aspects of international 
human rights law's understanding of rights related to marriage. 19 
This Article concludes, however, that the debate raised by these tribunals' dif-
fering approaches to forced marriage is not settled. While there is momentum around 
one definition-of that proffered by the Special Court's Appeals Chamber-it leaves 
the question raised by the Special Court's Taylor Trial Chamber unanswered: should 
the international criminal law community abandon the forced marriage terminology in 
favor of another label?20 
I. FORCED MARRIAGE AND 1RE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 
The Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone brought charges for forced 
marriage as the crime against humanity of "other inhumane acts" in two cases: 
14 See A1 Hassan Arrest Warrant, supra note 1; RUF Trial Judgment Press Release, supra 
note 7; RUF Appeals Judgment Press Release, supra note 7. 
1
' See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motion 
for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, Separate Concurring Opinionofthe Hon. Justice 
Julia Sebutinde,, 14 (Trial Chamber Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter AFRC Decision on Motion 
for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98] (stating that ''the acts of'forced marriage' that 
occurred within the context of the Sierra Leonean conflict, are in fact a form of sexual violence 
pursuant to Article 2.g. of the Statute and could equally quality as a form of sexual slavery 
pursuant to Article 2.g. of the Statute," but that she is ''not persuaded that the acts of'forced 
marriage' ... can be properly charged under the general regime of 'other inhumane acts' 
pursuant to Article 2.i. of the Statute''). 
16 See infra Part I. 
17 See infra Part I. Compare Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, 
, 713 (Trial Chamber II June 20, 2007) [hereinafter AFRC Trial Judgment], with Prosecutor 
v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Judgment, 1 195 (Appeals Chamber Feb. 22, 2008) 
[hereinafter AFRC Appeals Judgment]. 
18 See infra Part2; see also, e.g., Prosecutorv. Nuon, Case No. 002119-09-2007-ECCC-
OCIJ, Closing Order,, 1432, 1442-46(Sept.l5,2010) [hereinafterECCCClosingOrder]. 
19 See infra Part ill; see also, e.g., Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, supra note 1, 
, 88-93. 
20 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment,, 424-27,430 (Trial 
Chamber II May 18, 2012) [hereinafter Taylor Trial Judgment]. 
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Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kantl1 (referred to as the Armed Forces Revolu-
tionary Council or AFRC case), and Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbaifl (referred 
to as the Revolutionary United Front or RUF case).23 The trial judges of the Special 
Court also considered evidence of forced marriage in the case of Prosecutor v. Taylor 
in support of charges of sexual slavery and other forms of enslavement. 24 The Spe-
cial Court's Statute does not include a specifically enumerated violation called "forced 
marriage," which is why the charges were considered under the "other inhumane 
acts" category.25 
The judges in the AFRC trial were the first to consider the violation of forced 
marriage, which had never before been litigated at an international criminal tribunal. 26 
Given the lack of precedent, the judges had to identify the contours of the violation, 
which revealed their differing interpretations of the term as applied to the armed 
conflict in Sierra Leone.27 
The violation of forced marriage was not present in the original AFRC indict-
ment, but was added to the section titled "Sexual Violence" as a result of a later 
request by the Prosecutor. 28 In agreeing to the Prosecutor's request, the Trial Cham-
ber concluded that forced marriage was a "kindred offence" to the already-charged 
offenses of rape and sexual slavery.29 This was an early indication that at least some 
of the judges equated forced marriage with sexual offenses, rather than viewing 
forced marriage as a gendered offense containing both sexual and non-sexual 
elements (such as forced domestic labor and portering).30 This focus on the sexual 
21 Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment,~ 51-57 
(Feb. 18, 2005). 
22 Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT, Corrected Amended Consolidated Indictment,~ 60 (Aug. 2, 
2006). 
23 The Prosecutor requested the addition of forced marriage charges to a third case involving 
leaders of the Civil Defence Forces, but was denied See Prosecutorv. Norman, Case No. SCSL-
04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment(Trial Chamber 
May 20, 2004). For critiques of this decision and an explanation of the events that followed, see 
Michelle S. Kelsall & Shanee Stepakoff, 'When We Wanted to Talk About Rape': Silencing 
Sexual Violence at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1 INT'L J. TRANsmoNAL JusT. 355 
(2007); Valerie Oosterveld, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers, and Forced 
Ma"iage: Providing Clarity or Confusion?, 45 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 131, 159--68 (2007). 
24 Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 20, ~ 422, 424--30, 1101, 1700. 
25 See AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, ~ 701 (summarizing the Prosecutor's ex-
planation). 
26 See id. 
27 Id. ~ 701, 713-14. 
28 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for 
Leave to Amend the Indictment,~ 58 (Trial Chamber May 6, 2004) [hereinafter AFRC 
Motion to Amend Indictment]. 
29 Id. ~51-52. 
3° For more detail, see Valerie Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court for 
Sie"a Leone: Legal Advances and Conceptual Difficulties, 2 J.lNT'L & HUMANITARIAN 
LEGALS1UD. 127, 131 (2011). 
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aspects was confirmed by one of the judges midway through the 1rial.31 At that time, 
Justice Sebutinde indicated that ''the sexual element inherent in these acts [of forced 
marriage] tends to dominate the other elements therein" and therefore, in her view, 
the forced marriage evidence was already covered by the sexual slavery charge. 32 
The Prosecutor argued against this notion, distinguishing forced marriage from sexual 
slavery based on the status of"wife" conferred by the AFRC on its victims.33 In the 
Prosecutor's view, the victims of forced marriage suffered from banns that can be 
distinguished from those of sexual slavery: ''first, the non-consensual conferral of the 
status of'marriage' and the resulting long-lasting physical and psychological damage, 
as well as societal stigmatization, and, second, the harms caused by the consequent 
forced duties associated with being a 'wife. '"34 The Prosecutor seemed to have used 
the term "marriage" not in its strict legal sense as defined in international human rights 
law, but as a term meant to capture a corrupted version of pre-war peacetime marriages 
in Sierra Leone, in which women and girls were largely treated as subordinate to men. 35 
Justice Sebutinde revived her view in the final trial judgment, which was also 
adopted by a second judge. 36 As the majority, the judges dismissed the forced mar-
riage charges on the grounds that they were redundant and "completely subsumed" 
by the sexual slavery charges.37 The majority judges did not accept the Prosecutor's 
conceptualization of harms, nor that there was any evidence of these harms: 
Not one of the victims of sexual slavery gave evidence that the 
mere fact that a rebel had declared her to be his wife had caused 
her any particular trauma, whether physical or mental. More-
over, in the opinion of the Trial Chamber, had there been such 
evidence, it would not by itselfhave amounted to a crime against 
humanity, since it would not have been of similar gravity to the 
[other crimes against humanity listed in the Statute of the Spe-
cial Court for SierraLeone].38 
31 See AFRC Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, supra 
note 15. 
32 Id. ~ 16. 
33 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17,, 701. 
34 Oosterveld, supra note 30, at 132. 
35 I d. at 133. See Karine Belair, Unearthing the Customary Law Foundations of"Forced 
Marriages" During Sierra Leone's Civil War: The Possible Impact oflnternational Criminal 
Law on Customary Marriage and Women's Rights in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone, 15 COLUM. 
J. GENDER& L. 5 51, 567-77 (2006). The Special Court's Prosecutor referred to this as ''forced 
conjugal association" and a ''veneer" of marriage on appeal. AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra 
note 17,, 189. 
36 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, W 2116, 2120, 2123. 
37 /d.~ 713-14. 
38 /d. , 710. This assertion has been criticized. See, e.g., Neha Jain, Forced Marriage as 
a Crime Against Humanity: Problems of Definition and Prosecution, 6 J. INT'LCRIM:. JUST. 
1013, 1018 (2008). 
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Ultimately, this assertion signals that the majority judges approached forced 
marriage in a very different manner than the Prosecutor. In particular, while the 
Prosecutor used the term "marriage" in a metaphorical sense to cover a scenario of 
sexual and domestic slavery, the majority judges used it in a literal sense, defining 
''marriage" as "establishing mutual obligations inherent in a husband[-]wife relation-
ship. " 39 This view of mmriage, which is reflective of that found in international human 
rights law,40 was contrasted with the term ''wife." The majority judges concluded 
that the victims did not consider themselves to be married, but rather that the term 
''wife" was imposed on the victims as the rebels' label for sexual slavery.41 
The dissenting judge, Justice Doherty, did not support this llU\iority view. 42 Taking 
a position similar to that of the Prosecutor, she categorized the ''marriage" in Sierra 
Leonean-wartime-forced-marriage as something distinct within international criminal 
law.43 She defined the violation as "the imposition, by threat or physical force arising 
from the perpetrator's words or other conduct, of a forced conjugal association by 
the perpetrator over the victim.'744 This "forced conjugal association" was not the 
same as marriage under international human rights law (or under traditional Sierra 
Leonean law); while it echoed international human rights law in focusing on non-
consent, the ''marriage" portion referred instead to a form of"ownership by a particular 
rebel.'>45 She pointed out that the line between this international criminal law version 
of wartime "wife" and peacetime understandings of "wife" in Sierra Leone become 
somewhat blurred when one considers the post-war context: some of the victims 
remained with their "husbands" after the war because they could not find an alternative 
to this situation, they accepted their lot in life, they were rejected by their families 
and communities, or they felt an obligation to rear the children born during the forced 
maniage.46 However, she added that the decision to remain in the forced marriage 
does not negate the original criminality of the act. 47 
39 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17,1711. 
40 It is reflective of international human rights law in terms of implying freely given 
consent and obligations attached to that consent. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. 
Doc. N6316 (1966); 999 U.N. T.S. 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967) (entry into force Mar. 23, 1976), 
art. 23(3}-{4). 
41 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, 1 712. 
42 Id; Partly Dissenting Opinion ofJustice Doherty on Count 7 (Sexual Slavery) and Count 
8 ('Forced Marriages'), 11 14-15. 
43 Id 11 53, 58-71. 
44 Id 153. 
45 Id 11 36, 46, 53, 63-65, 69, 71. 
46 Id 1 45. This is consistent with other observations of the continuum of gender-based 
violence and discrimination before, during, and after war. See, e.g., FIONNUALA N. AoLAIN, 
DINA F. HAYNES & NAOMI CAHN, ON THE FRONTLINES: GENDER, WAR, AND THE Posr-
CONFLICTPROCESS 36--39 (2011). 
47 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, at Doherty Dissent, '11 45. 
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Justice Doherty also concluded that forced marriage was a type of violation with 
important aspects that differentiated it from sexual slavery, and thus forced marriage 
could not be entirely subsumed within the sexual slavery charges. 48 She found that 
forced marriage differs from sexual slavery because it "is concerned with the mental 
and physical trauma of being forced unwillingly into a marital arrangement, the 
stigma associated with being labeled a rebel 'wife' and the corresponding rejection 
by the community.'149 
Justice Doherty additionally rejected the majority's conclusion that there was 
no evidence that the status of' 'wife" caused trauma to victims: "I find the label of'wife' 
to a rebel caused mental trauma, stigmatised the victims and negatively impacted 
their ability to reintegrate into their communities."50 In particular, the victims' mental 
trauma included being "forced to associate with and in some cases live together with 
men whom they may fear or despise."51 
On appeal, the Appeals Chamber rejected the majority judges' view that forced 
marriage was the same as sexual slavery.52 Using strong language, it stated: ''the 
Appeals Chamber finds that no tribunal could reasonably have found that forced 
marriage was subsumed in the crime against humanity of sexual slavery."53 This is 
because forced marriage may be distinguished from sexual slavery in two ways: 
First, forced marriage involves a perpetrator compelling a person 
by force or threat of force ... into a conjugal association with 
another person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or 
mental injury on the part of the victim. Second, unlike sexual 
slavery, forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity be-
tween the ''husband" and ''wife," which could lead to disciplinary 
consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement. 54 
The Appeals Chamber contrasted this with exercises of power attaching to the 
right of ownership required in sexual slavery. 55 The Appeals Chamber also identified 
a number of harms associated with forced marriage that may further differentiate it 
from sexual slavery, including injuries to victims from the imposition of the label 
''wife," social ostracization, forced domestic labor such as cooking and cleaning, 
forced reproductive work such as forced pregnancy and forced child-rearing, forced 
sexual exclusivity, and serious punishment for failure to carry out these tasks. 56 It 
48 Id 1[14, 50. 
49 Id. 1[42. 
so Id. 1[51. 
51 Id 1[48. 
52 AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 17, 1[195. 
53 Id. 
54 Id 
55 See id. 1[190. 
56 Id. mr 190-93, 199-2oo. 
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pointed out that the "husbands" in the Sierra Leonean wartime forced marriages were 
expected to provide food, clothing, and protection to their "wives," including protection 
from rape by other men, acts they would not necessarily perform for sexual slaves. 57 
Echoing Justice Doherty's approach, the Appeals Chamber concluded that forced 
marriage can be defined as: 
[A] situation in which the perpetrator[.] through his words or con-
duct, or those of someone for whose actions he is responsible, 
compels a person by force, threat of force, or coercion to serve as 
a conjugal partner resulting in severe suffering, or physical, men-
tal or psychological injury to the victim. 51 
In this definition, the Appeals Chamber appears to have accepted that the term "forced 
marriage" does not need to refer to legal marriage identified under international 
human rights law. 59 Instead, it assumes that a "marriage-like" scenario--albeit one 
with massive differences in power between the ''wife" and the "husband"-taking 
place during an armed conflict suffices to satisfy the term. 60 Ultimately, the Appeals 
Chamber did not enter fresh convictions for forced marriage, relying instead on the 
expressive nature of its conclusion that forced marriage is criminal in nature. 61 
The consideration of forced marriage by the Trial and Appeals Chambers in the 
AFRC case set the stage for further consideration in Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and 
Gbao. 62 In that case, the Trial Chamber avoided the debates that underlay the AFRC 
case over how "marriage" should be construed.63 Rather, the RUF Trial Chamber fo-
cused on the question of whether the collection of acts termed "forced marriage" in the 
Sierra Leone context satisfied the elements of the crime against humanity of"other in-
humane acts.•o64 It considered evidence of: the capture or abduction of girls and women 
by RUF forces; their subsequent assignment as ''wives" ofRUF fighters; their expected 
loyalty to their "husbands"; the expectation that these ''wives" would submit to sex on 
demand from their "husbands" and maintain this exclusive sexual relationship; forced 
domestic labor and portering by the ''wives"; forced childbearing and child-rearing; 
57 Id 1[190. 
58 Id 1[196. 
59 See id mr 184-85, 194-95. 
~0 The Appeals Chamber discusses the difference between traditional arranged marriages, 
marriage as set out in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDA W), and wartime forced marriage in Sierra Leone. Id 1[194. 
~1 Id 1[202. 
u See RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, mf 1178, 1211. 
~3 See id mf 165--67. 
64 See id 1[ 168. This approach was affirmed on appeal (though the Appeals Chamber also 
reiterated its definition of forced marriage set out in the AFRC Appeals Judgment). Prosecutor 
v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment, mf 735-36 (Appeals Chamber Oct. 26, 2009) 
[hereinafter RUF Appeals Judgment]. 
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fear by the "wives" of violent retribution for failing in any of the expected responsi-
bilities; and long-lasting societal stigma for having been labeled an RUF "wife."65 
Instead of focusing on "marriage," the Trial Chamber focused on the word 
''wife." The Trial Chamber found that ''the use of the term 'wife' by the rebels was 
deliberate and strategic, with the aim of enslaving and psychologically manipulating 
the women and with the purpose of treating them like possessions. •o66 The Trial 
Chamber concluded that forced marriage played an important role in effectively 
disempowering and instilling fear within the civilian population, isolating the victims 
and destroying family nuclei, and undermining Sierra Leonean society. 67 It convicted 
the accused, resulting in the frrst international criminal convictions for forced mar-
riage in armed conflict. 68 
Ultimately, the Trial Chamber seems to have adopted an approach which is 
specific to international criminal law. 69 Under this approach, the international human 
rights law definition of consensual, legal marriage is not at issue. Rather, the focus 
is on the term ''wife" and a collection of non-consensual hanns termed "forced mar-
riage" that qualify as the crime against humanity of"other inhumane acts." 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone considered forced marriage in a third and flna1 
case: that of the former President ofLiberia, Charles Taylor. 70 While Taylor was not 
charged with forced marriage as the crime against humanity of"other inhumane acts," 
evidence of forced marriage was used to support other charges, including those of sex-
ual slavery.71 The Taylor Trial Chamber-which contained the same judges as the 
AFRC Trial Chamber-used the opportunity to opine on the term ''forced marriage. "72 
Recall that the llliYority judges in the AFRC Trial Chamber focused on the ''marriage" 
aspect of the term, defining marriage in a manner reflective of international human 
rights law.73 
In the Taylor judgment, the Trial Chamber returned to this theme, finding that the 
term ''forced marriage" is a ''misnomer" because there was ''not marriage in the uni-
versally understood sense of a consensual and sacrosanct union."74 Thus, the Trial 
Chamber felt that it was "inappropriate to refer to the perpetrators as 'husbands. "'75 
6
' RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, mf 1154-55, 1211-13, 1293, 1295-96, 1412-13, 
1466--72. 
66 Id. ~ 1466. 
67 Id. mr 1348-49. 
68 RUF Trial Judgment Press Release, supra note 7; RUF Appeals Judgment Press Release, 
supra note 7. 
69 See RUF Trial Judgment Press Release, supra note 7,, 1466. 
70 See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 20, , 8. 
71 Id. mr 422, 1101, 11oo. 
72 Id. mr 424-26, 429. 
73 See AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, mf 701, 703--Q5; supra notes 39-41 and 
accompanying text. 
74 Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 20, mf 425, 427. 
7
' Id. ~ 426. 
1272 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1263 
This view reflected the views of some commentators, who had expressed concerns 
that no actual marriage had occurred in the Sierra Leone scenario. 76 Rather, the Trial 
Chamber redefined the acts previously described as forced marriage by the Special 
Court as "conjugal slavery.'m Conjugal slavery, according to the Taylor trial judges, 
was simply the combination of sexual slavery and enslavement through forced domestic 
labor. 78 The Trial Chamber stressed that conjugal slavery is not a new crime, but is 
a term encompassing two forms of slavery. 79 In recharacterizing forced marriage as 
conjugal slavery, the Trial Chamber attempted to redirect the discussion away from 
whether or not legal or other forms of marriage are required for the violation. 
Despite the lack of uniformity in the manner in which the AFRC, RUF, and Taylor 
judgments approached forced marriage, the Special Court's jurisprudence has influ-
enced discussions of forced marriage by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of 
Cambodia and the International Criminal Court. This Article therefore turns next to 
an examination of how the ECCC has interpreted forced marriage as a violation of 
international criminal law. 
II. THE ExTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF 
CAMBODIA AND FORCED MARRIAGE 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia were created to prose-
cute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed during the 
1975-1979 Khmer Rouge regime.8° Forced marriage was not initially investigated 
by the ECCC due to incorrect but widely held assumptions that the Khmer Rouge 
regime was largely devoid of sexual or gender-based violence, but later launched an 
investigation at the prompting of the civil parties.81 Forced marriage was therefore 
76 SeeJenniferGong-Gershowitz,ForcedMarriage: A "New" CrimeAgainstHumanity?, 
8 NW. J.INT'L HUM. RTS. 53, 65--66 (2009); Patricia V. SeUers, Wartime Female Slavery: 
Enslavement?, 44 CORNEU..INT'LL. J. 115, 130 n.97, 137, 142 (2011). 
77 Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 20,, 428. Note that the issue of conjugal slavery versus 
forced marriage was not addressed by the Appeals Chamber. 
78 Jd., 430. 
19 I d. Note, however, some confusing language at, 429:"[I]he Trial Chamber considers 
that conjugal slavery is better conceptualized as a distinctive form of the crime of sexual slavery, 
with the additional component described by the Appeals Chamber." The actual practice of 
the Trial Chamber, however, was to consider the forced marriage evidence under both the 
sexual slavecy and enslavement (forced labor) charges, as explained in, 427-28, 430. 
80 Law on the Establishment ofExtraordinacy Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for 
the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (200 1) 
(Cambodia), as amended by NSIRKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004), https://www.eccc.gov.kh 
/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR _ Law_as_amended_ 27 _Oct_ 2004 _ Eng.pdf[https:// 
perma.cc/KM6E-QYHS] [hereinafter ECCC Governing Law]. 
11 See Prosecutorv. Nuon, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCCOCIJ, Order on Request for In-
vestigative Action Concerning Forced Marriages and Forced Sexual Relations (Dec. 18, 2009) 
[hereinafter ECCC Investigative Order on Forced Marriage]; Prosecutor v. Nuon, Case No. 
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considered in the Closing Order for Case 002, as well as in the second judgment in 
that case. 82 
The Closing Order for Case 002, issued in September 2010, described how forced 
marriage was one of the five policies implemented by the Communist Party ofKampu-
chea to implement the "great leap forward" within Cambodia's socialist revolution. 83 
The Communist Party regulated marriage to control sexual interactions between men 
and women and simultaneously to reconstruct the meaning of marriage in the country. 84 
The Communist Party organized mass weddings of men and women who were forcibly 
married to each other in public buildings or public places. 85 The men and women usu-
ally did not know each other prior to the weddings.86 If they refused to marry, they 
could be executed. 87 The forcibly married couples were expected to rapidly consum-
mate their marriages, and thus, were often under surveillance. 88 The goal of the forced 
marriages was to quickly increase the population of desirable citizens through births. 89 
In other words, forced marriage was used to control sexual relations within the 
Cambodian population in order to socially engineer the future population through 
forced procreation.90 
The Closing Order charged forced marriage under the crimes against humanity of 
rape and "other inhumane acts.'>91 The use ofthe "other inhumane acts" category was 
influenced by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 92 The actus reus was defined as ''vic-
tims endured serious physical or mental suffering or injury," including sexual violence, 
002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Supplementary Submission (Apr. 30, 2009); Silke Studzinsky, 
Victims ofSexual and Gender-Based Crimes Before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Caurts 
of Cambodia: Challenges of Rights to Participation and Protection, in SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 173, 179 {Anne-Marie de 
Brouwer et al. eds., 2013). 
82 ECCC Closing Order, supra note 18, ~ 156--57. 
83 Id 
14 Id ~ 216--17. 
8
' Id ~ 220, 842, 844. These weddings ranged anywhere from two to over 100 couples. 
Id ~ 844. 
86 Id ~ 849. 
87 Id ~ 849-50. 
88 Id ~ 220,314, 858, 1432. 
89 See id ~ 1447. 
90 See ROCHEllE BRAAF, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST ETIINIC MINORITIES DURING THE 
KHMERRouGEREGIME24-31 (2014) (for a victim-focused study on the state control inherent 
in these forced marriages). 
91 ECCC Closing Order, supra note 18, ~ 1432, 1442-46. This Closing Order, in which 
forced marriage is discussed at length, was issued in 2010. This was prior to the Special Cowt' s 
2012 trial judgment in Taylor, in which the Trial Chamber expressed the view that forced mar-
riage was actually conjugal slavery consisting of forced labor plus sexual slavery. See Taylor 
Trial Judgment, supra note 20. Note also that the ECCC's governing law does not list sexual 
slavery as a crime. See ECCC Governing Law, supra note 80. 
92 See ECCC Investigative Order on Forced Marriage, supra note 81,, 11. 
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and ''were forced to enter into conjugal relationships in coercive circumstances.'>93 
The mens rea was that ''the perpetrators knew of the factual circumstances that es-
tablished the gravity of their acts.'794 
The Co-Prosecutors' Closing Brief, filed at the end of the second trial in Case 
002, sets forth a more detailed understanding of forced marriage under the Khmer 
Rouge, bringing together both international criminal and human rights law.95 The 
Closing Brief highlighted three main aspects of the centralized forced marriage 
policy of the Communist Party ofKampuchea. 
First, it contrasted forced marriages under the Khmer Rouge regime with two 
types of "consent from the bride and groom" and their families--consent to spousal 
selection and consent to the marriage itself-that traditionally underpinned marriage 
in Cambodian society prior to the regime. 96 It did so while highlighting the ''rich tradi-
tion" and "sacred rituals" that accompanied the decision by spouses and their families 
to get married in pre-Khmer Rouge Cambodia.97 They also invoked the role of law 
and ceremony in these weddings. 91 In comparison, marriages under the Khmer Rouge 
"lacked consent from one or both spouses.'>99 The Communist Party of Kampuchea 
''removed the right of Cambodian people to marry freely to their partner of choice" 
and decided ''whether, when, and whom couples would marry."100 In this manner, 
the Co-Prosecutors were alluding to international human rights law's focus on freely 
given spousal consent and selection. 101 
Second, the Co-Prosecutors focused on the consequence of the forced marriage: 
forced consummation through rape.102 The Communist Party of Kampuchea "felt 
entitled to take absolute control over 'family building' and sexual life," which were 
expected to be sacrificed in order to build ''revolutionary families" to serve the state 
ideology. 103 As a result, "[ c ]lose monitoring of the new couples [to ensure that they 
had sex] was, therefore, typically organised immediately after the weddings. "104 The 
93 ECCC Closing Order, supra note 18,, 1443. 
94 Id. , 1444. 
95 Prosecutorv. Nuon, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/fC, Co-Prosecutors' Closing Brief: 
, 5 85--86 (Trial Chamber May 2, 20 17) [hereinafter ECCC Co-Prosecutors' Closing Brief]. 
This Closing Brief discusses the central Communist Party ofKampuchea policy around pair-
ings, organization and notification of marriages, and the monitoring of consummation, carried 
out in a similar, organized fashion. 
96 Id., 583. 
97 Id. 
98 See ki., 611. 
99 Id., 585. See also, 611-13. 
100 Id. , 593, 599. 
101 See id. at 3 61 n.240 1 (referring to a violation of Article 16 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights on the right to marriage and family). 
102 See id. , 585-86. 
103 Id. , 587--88. 
104 Id. , 598. 
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result was that "sexual intercourse took place without the consent of either one or 
both participants in the sexual act and constituted rape. "105 
Third, the Co-Prosecutors highlighted the "clinical[] execut[ion]" ofthe Com-
munist Party of Kampuchea's forced marriage policy.106 Every aspect of forced 
marriage under the Khmer Rouge was regulated. 107 Authorities were directed to 
create male-female couples based on "identical political class, ethnicity, and back-
ground."108 The marriages were tracked and reports were sent up the hierarchy to the 
Party Centre. 109 Tens of thousands of men and women were forced into marriage 
under the Khmer Rouge, mostly with little to no advance notice. 110 "Many had never 
met their spouse before the ceremony and some were unable to recognise him or her 
afterwards."111 The spouses were not permitted to object; the consequences could be 
severe. 112 The circumstances of the forced marriages left many of the victims deeply 
upset and suffering from physical and mental trauma. 113 
In setting out their view of the applicable law, the Co-Prosecutors referred both 
to international human rights law and international criminallaw.114 They begin by 
noting that"[ t]he right to be free of a coerced marriage is so fundamental that it was 
recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" in 1948, and numerous 
subsequent international instruments. 115 They then proposed a definition of forced 
marriage based on the Special Court for Sierra Leone Appeals Chamber's approach: 
"[F]orced marriage occurs when the perpetrator compels a person by force, threat 
of force, or coercion to serve as a conjugal partner."116 The Co-Prosecutors then 
focused on lack of consent as defined in international criminal law to argue that a 
coercive environment, such as that created by the Khmer Rouge, vitiates consent. 117 
In other words, the Co-Prosecutors proposed that, while international human rights 
law informs the understanding of forced marriage as lacking consent, international 
criminal law explains the contexts in which lack of consent is inherent. 118 
105 Id 1[615. 
106 See id 1[587. 
107 See id 1[599. 
108 Id 1[600. 
1o9 Id 
110 Id 1[601. 
m Id 
112 See id mf 603--04. 
113 Id mr 601, 620-27. 
114 See id mf 119-20 (referring to statutes ofvarious ad hoc international tribunals, including 
the ICTY, ICTR, and ECCC). 
m Id 1[188 (referring to the 1964 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Article 23(3) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Articles 8 and 12 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights). 
116 ECCC Co-Prosecutors' Closing Brie±: supra note 95, 1[ 189 (citing AFRC Appeals Judg-
ment, supra note 17, 1[ 196 and RUF Appeals Judgment, supra note 64, mf 735-36). 
117 See id. 1[190. 
118 See id 
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The ECCC's Trial Chamber issued its second judgment in Case 002 in Novem-
ber 20 18.119 The Trial Chamber found that, under the Khmer Rouge, "[i]ndividuals 
were married in a widespread climate of fear and the consent purportedly given either 
before or during wedding ceremonies did not amount in most cases to genuine con-
sent."120 Additionally, these marriages were followed by forced sexual intercourse 
between the new spouses.121 The two accused were therefore convicted of the crime 
against humanity of"other inhumane acts" committed through forced marriage and 
rape in the context of forced marriage. 122 This judgement therefore became the first 
to address forced marriage outside of armed conflict as a violation of international 
criminal law. 123 
The Sierra Leone and Cambodian circumstances were similar in some ways, but 
also very different. 124 In both contexts, forced marriage was an important policy tool 
to achieve the goals of the controlling group. 125 As well, forced marriage was carried 
out through violence or threats of violence. 126 Additionally, in both countries, the 
joining of one person to another took place without traditional rituals or the custom-
ary presence of the bride and groom's parents or relatives.127 On the other hand, in 
Sierra Leone the victims were all identified as female and were not married under 
Sierra Leonean law, 128 whereas in Cambodia, the victims were both male and female 
and were married under Khmer Rouge law. 129 In Sierra Leone, the forced marriages 
119 The ECCC's Trial Chamber has only issued a smnmary of the judgment At the time of 
writing, the full judgment was not yet available. See Summary of Judgment in Case 002/02, 
supra note 11. 
120 Id. ~ 40. 
121 See id. 
122 Id. mr 41, s1, 6o. 
123 See ECCC Co-Prosecutors' Closing Brief;, supra note 95, 1 190 (discussing forced mar-
riage within the context of a coercive environment or climate of fear that can exist independently 
of armed conflict). 
124 See also Jain, supra note 38, at 1025-28; Bridgette A. Toy-Cronin, What is Forced 
Marriage? Towards a Definition ofF arced Marriage as a Crime Against Humanity, 19 CoLUM. 
J. GENDER&L. 539,544-56,561,587 (2010). 
12
' RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, W 1348-49; ECCC Closing Order, supra note 18, 
mr 216-17. 
126 See AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 17, ~ 195 (providing the Special Court's 
definition of''forced marriage''); RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, W 1467--68 (discussing 
threats and violence); ECCC Closing Order, supra note 18, mf 849-50 (discussing the po-
tential of execution). 
127 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, ~ 36 of Partly Dissenting Opinion of Justice 
Doherty on Count 7 (Sexual Slavery) and Count 8 ("Forced Marriage''); ECCC Co-Prosecutors' 
Closing Brief, supra note 95, W 583, 611. 
128 Jain, supra note 38, at 1026. 
129 See generally Omer Aijazi & Erin Baines, Relationality, Culpability and Consent in 
Wartime: Men's Experiences of Farced Marriage, 11INT'LJ. TRANsmONALJUST. 463 (2017) 
(discussing the issue of male experiences of forced marriage in war). 
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occurred during an armed conflict with non-state actors as the perpetrators, 130 while 
in Cambodia the state was the perpetrator. 131 In Sierra Leone, forced marriage in-
cluded forced domestic labor, 132 but in Cambodia, forced labor was not an inherent 
part of the forced marriage experience--it was part of the overarching Khmer Rouge 
revolutionary program and forced on virtually all Cambodians.133 This means that 
the Special Court's Taylor Trial Chamber's recharacterization of forced marriage 
as conjugal slavery would likely not apply to the Khmer Rouge situation. 
The fact that one international criminal law label-forced marriage--can be 
applied to two diverse circumstances illustrates the flexibility of the term. However, 
this flexibility also indicates that the violation of forced marriage is undertheorized, 
given the significant difference between the Special Court's reliance on forced conjugal 
(domestic and sexual) labor as an integral part of the definition and the ECCC' s 
different emphasis on lack of consent to marriage and rape after marriage. 134 
ill. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND FORCED MARRIAGE 
As with the 2002 Statute of the Special Court and the 2001 Statute of the ECCC, 
the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) does not list forced 
marriage as a crime against humanity (or any other type of crime). 135 Indeed, the de-
cision to charge forced marriage under the crime against humanity of"other inhumane 
acts" at the Special Court for Sierra Leone occurred in 2004, after the adoption of 
these Statutes. 136 
While the Special Court had already established jurisprudence on forced marriage 
by the time the ICC began considering cases with similar fact scenarios, the ICC's 
Prosecutor did not initially charge forced marriage; instead, in Prosecutor v. Katanga, 
the prosecution charged facts involving forced marriage as sexual slavery.137 In that 
case, the Pre-Trial Chamber linked sexual slavery and forced marriage when observing 
130 The individuals prosecuted for forced marriage were from the Revolutionary United 
Front and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council rebel groups. See supra Part I. 
131 The ECCC Closing Order describes a state of international armed conflict between 
Cambodia and Vietnam during the relevant time period. ECCC Closing Order, supra note 
18, mf 150--55. However, the imposition afforced marriages throughout the country as part 
of the socialist revolution was not directly related to that international armed conflict, as evi-
denced in the description of the forced marriage facts at fJ 216--20, which were separate from 
the war-related facts at W 150--55. 
132 See, e.g., RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, mf 1154-55, 1211-12, 1293, 1413, 1472. 
133 ECCCClosingOrder,supranote 18, mf3ll, 334,336--37,358,377,390--91,407, 1394. 
134 See AFR.C Appeals Judgment, supra note 17, mf 190, 199; Summary of Judgment in 
Case 002/02, supra note 11, ~ 40. 
m See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 U.N. Doc. NCONF. 183/9 (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
136 See AFRC Motion to Amend Indictment, supra note 28, ~ 8. 
137 Case No. ICC-0 1/04-01/07, Decision on the Confinnation of Charges,~ 431, 434-35 
(Sept. 30, 2008). 
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that "sexual slavery also encompasses situations where women and girls are forced 
into 'marriage', domestic servitude or other forced labour involving compulsory sexual 
activity, including rape, by their captors."138 While the Pre-Trial Chamber was likely 
explaining why it was acceptable to consider evidence of forced marriage under the 
sexual slavery charge, this observation harkened back to the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone's AFRC Trial Chamber's view that sexual slavery "subsume[s]" forced mar-
riage. 139 The ICC Office of the Prosecutor's 2014 Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes does not discuss forced marriage, presumably continuing to consider 
forced marriage as falling under sexual slavery at the time the document was released. 140 
However, beginning with the case of Prosecutor v. Ongwen, the Office of the 
Prosecutor changed direction and charged forced marriage under the same category 
of crimes against humanity-"other inhumane acts"---used in the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone and the ECCC. 141 Ongwen is a former senior leader and brigade com-
mander of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. 142 He is charged 
with responsibility for a number of gender-based crimes, including rape, sexual slavery, 
forced pregnancy and forced marriage--in fact, his case "currently has the highest 
number of counts of sexual and gender-based crimes charges before the ICC. "143 
These charges include direct responsibility for forcing girls and women to serve as 
his "wives" and therefore as sexual and domestic slaves. 144 He is also accused of in-
direct responsibility for forced marriage as part of a common plan "to abduct women 
and girls in order for them to serve as forced 'wives', domestic servants and sex slaves 
to male LRA fighters. "145 These "wives" "lived under constant threat of death or se-
vere physical punishment if they failed to respect the exclusivity of the so-called 
'marriage' imposed upon them, if they did not submit to sexual intercourse, if they 
tried to escape, or if they failed to perform any other duty assigned to them. "146 
At the Confirmation of Charges stage, the defense argued that the forced marriage 
charges are subsumed under the sexual slavery charges, as the conduct for one is the 
same as the conduct for the other.147 Relying on the Special Court for Sierra Leone's 
AFRC Appeals Chamber judgment and the ECCC's Closing Order in Case 002, the 
138 Id ~ 431. 
139 See AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, ~ 713-14. 
140 See International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Sexual and 
Gender-Based Crimes 'J 34 (2014) (having the opportunity to address forced marriage, but 
choosing not to address it). 
141 See Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, supra note 1. 
142 See id ~ 3, 54, 58. 
143 WOMEN'S INmATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE, GENDER REPoRT CARD ON 1HE INTER.-
NATIONALCRIMINALCOURT2018,at123(2018).Forahelpfulsummarychartofthesecharges, 
see id. at 124. 
144 See Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, supra note 1, ~ 102--{)4. 
145 Id ~ 137. 
146 Id. 
147 See id ~ 87--88. 
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Ongwen Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that forced marriage may be charged as an 
"other inhumane act"v18 It held that forced marriage "differs from the other crimes with 
which Dominic Ongwen in charged, and notably from the crime of sexual slavery, in 
terms of conduct, ensuing harm, and protected interests."149 This difference is twofold. 
First, forced marriage involves a forced conjugal union which is required to be exclu-
sive: this "element of exclusivity ... is the characteristic aspect of forced marriage and 
is an element which is absent" from sexual slavery. 150 Second, forced marriage differs 
from sexual slavery because it involves the imposition of''marriage" on the victim, "i.e. 
the imposition, regardless of the will of the victim, of duties that are associated with 
marriage, as well as of a social status of the perpetrator's 'wife. "'15 1 Importantly, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber addressed the issue of the term "marriage"-a term that caused dif-
ficulties in the Special Court for Sierra Leone's jurisprudence-by stating that: the ''mar-
riage" need not be legal. 152 It recognized international human rights law by concluding 
that forced marriage "violates the independently recognised basic right to consensually 
marry and establish a family. This basic right is indeed the value (distinct from e.g., 
physical or sexual integrity, or personal liberty) that demands protection ... !'153 In 
other words, rather than focusing on whether the ''marriage" in "forced marriage" meets 
the requirements of marriage under international law, the Pre-Trial Chamber focused 
on what the '1narriage" prevents: a consensual choice to marry another and a deci-
sion to establish a family through the consensual choice. This is an implicit rejoinder 
to the Special Court for Sierra Leone's Taylor trial judgment, which deemed "forced 
marriage" to be a misnomer. 154 The ICC will likely further develop its consideration 
of forced marriage in the On gwen trial judgment, expected in 20 19 or 2020. 155 
Forced marriage has been explicitly charged a second time at the ICC in the case 
of Prosecutor v. AI Hassan. 156 In that case, Al Hassan is charged with events taking 
place in Timbuktu, Mali, in 2012-2013.157 He is alleged to have served as the de facto 
chief of the Islamic police and involved in the work of the Islamic court under Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine, which had taken control of 
Timbuktu during this time period.158 The Warrant of Arrest alleges that Al Hassan 
148 See id. mf 89-92. 
149 Id. ~ 92. 
15o Id. ~ 93. 
151 Id. 
152 See id. ("The fact that such 'marriage' is illegal and not recognised by, in this case, 
Uganda, is irrelevant''). It appears that the intra-LRA understanding of whether there was a 
"marriage" is the crucial fact, as opposed to whether there was marriage under Ugandan law. 
153 Id. ~ 94 (footnotes omitted). 
154 See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 20, mf 425, 427. 
155 See generally Ongwen Case, INT'LCRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/ugandalongwen 
[https://perma.cc/PX2E-YQA2]. 
156 See Al Hassan Arrest Warrant, supra note 1, ~ 9. 
157 See id. ~ 3. 
158 See id. mf 5, 7, 8. 
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played a part in implementing the policy of forced marriages created by AQIM and 
Ansar Dine, ''which victimized the female population of Timbuktu and gave rise to 
repeated rapes and the sexual enslavement of women and girls."159 Forced marriage has 
been charged as the crime against humanity of"other inhumane acts," as was done for 
all other forced marriage charges in the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the 
ECCC. 160 AI Hassan is also charged with rape, sexual slavery and gender-based per-
secution. 161 As this case is still at an early stage, with the Confirmation of Charges hear-
ing scheduled for May 2019, there is no specific jurisprudence yet indicating whether 
the AI Hassan Pre-Trial Chamber will follow the approach to forced marriage set out 
by the Ongwen Pre-Trial Chamber. 162 The facts in the Warrant of Arrest do not reveal 
if there is a forced domestic labor component to the forced marriages, or whether the 
ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber will need to adopt an approach closer to that of the ECCC.163 
CONCLUSION: DEFINTI10NAL COHERENCE AND DISSONANCE 
REGARDING FORCED MARRIAGE 
There is no single conceptualization of forced marriage under international 
criminal law. Even so, the sparse case law to date indicates that there is some mo-
mentum around the Special Court for Sierra Leone Appeals Chamber's definition 
of forced marriage, under which: 
[A ]n accused, by force, threat of force, or coercion, or by taking 
advantage of coercive circumstances, causes one or more per-
sons to serve as a conjugal partner, and the perpetrator's acts are 
knowingly part of a widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population and amount to the infliction of great suffer-
ing, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 164 
This definition was referenced by the ECCC and the ICC. 165 This growing-albeit 
nascent-coherence provides a basis on which international criminal law can continue 
to develop its understanding and theorization of forced marriage. 
At the same time, the case law examined in this Article reveals some fluidity in 
the definition and content of the "forced marriage" label This flexibility can be helpful, 
given the diverse and complex range of practices referred to as forced marriage 
159 Id. ~ 9. 
160 See id. ~ 12. 
161 See id. 
162 See Al Hassan Case, INT'L CRIM. CT., https:/lwww.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-hassan!Pages/de 
fault.aspx [https:/ /perma.cc/57:XZ-5ZPY] (displaying the next session date as May 6, 20 19). 
163 See generally Al Hassan Arrest Warrant, supra note 1. 
164 RUF Appeals Judgment, supra note 64, ~ 736. 
165 See ECCC Closing Order, supra note 18,, 1443; Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, 
supra note 1, ~ 89. 
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around the world. 166 It may allow future prosecutors applying international criminal 
law to charge forced marriage as the crime against humanity of"other inhumane acts" 
in scenarios that are different from Sierra Leone, Cambodia and Uganda. It may also 
allow prosecutors to better reflect the views of the victims of forced marriage, de-
pending on whether they better identify with another crime category, such as "sexual 
slavery" or "enslavement."167 
However, the fluidity also reveals that important questions have not yet been 
definitively answered. For example, the Special Court's Appeals Chamber uses the 
term forced "conjugal partner";168 what does "conjugal" mean in this context? Is 
forced domestic labor (or other forms of enslavement) an integral part of "conju-
gal"? If so, then how can this be reconciled with the ECCC's approach? If forced 
domestic labor is not integral, then why did the Special Court consider this type of 
labor in detail in the RUF case? Finally, what should be done with respect to the 
Taylor Trial Chamber's admonition that forced marriage is a misnomer and should 
be replaced by "conjugal slavery''? 
The tribunals' defmition of"conjugal" is unclear. The Special Court seems to 
include sexual intercourse, domestic labor, childcare and child rearing within 
conjugality. 169 However, this list does not work for the ECCC, which only examined 
forced consummation.170 The ICC's approach in Ongwen may provide an answer to 
the differences noted between the Special Court and the ECCC's approaches to conju-
gal duties. In Ongwen, the Pre-Trial Chamber identified two central elements of 
forced marriage: the imposition of''marriage" and its associated duties on a victim, 
and the imposition of required sexual or other exclusivity. 171 The Chamber also set 
out a range of additional indicators of forced marriage, including "restrictions on the 
freedom of movement, repeated sexual abuse, forced pregnancy, [andl]or forced 
labour," such as forced domestic duties. 172 This list of elements and indicators show 
that both the Special Court and the ECCC's approaches can be reconciled. 
Taking a cue from the Taylor Trial Chamber, some have argued that interna-
tional criminal law should eliminate the use of forced marriage as a charging label.173 
While the Taylor Trial Chamber recommended switching to the use of "conjugal 
166 See MARRIAGE BY FORCE?: CONTESTATION OVER CONSENT AND COERCION IN AFRICA 
2 (Annie Bunting, Benjamin N. Lawrance & Richard L. Robert eds., 2016). 
167 Andrea Raab & Siobhan Hobbs, Forced Relationships: Prosecutorial Discretion as a 
Pathway to Survivor-Centric Justice, OPINIOJURIS (Sept. 13, 20 18), http://opiniojuris.org/20 18 
/09/13/forced-relationships-prosecutorial-discretion-as-a-pathway-to-survivor-centric-justice 
[https://perma.cc/R2WQ-H8RD]. 
168 See AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 17,11 196. 
169 See id 1[ 190; RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, 1[ 1293. 
170 See Summary of Judgment in Case 002102, supra note 11, 1[ 40. 
171 See Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, supra note 1, 1[ 93. 
172 Id 1[ 92. It is unclear whether the AI Hassan case will adopt similar indicators. 
173 For example, Zawati proposes ''marital slavery" as an alternative label. See HILMIM. 
ZA WATI, FAIR LABELLING AND 1HE DILEMMA OF PROSECUTING GENDER-BASED CRIMES AT 
1HE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 129 (20 14). 
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slavery" as reflecting a combination of sexual and domestic slavery, some are con-
cerned that the reference to "conjugal" will simply add to the confusion or will 
compound "patriarchal societal norms and a conservative construction of a woman's 
roles [sic] in society and the home."174 Others recommend simply defining forced 
marriage acts as enslavement, or propose an understanding of forced marriage within 
the wider category of forced relationships, accompanied by prosecutorial discretion 
as to how to charge the forced relationships (e.g., as sexual slavery, enslavement, 
forced marriage, or something else).175 
Given that the term continues to be used within international criminal law, forced 
marriage as a label seems to have some legal and factual resonance for prosecutors 
and some victims. 176 Charging of the same term under the same crime against hu-
manity heading has created some nominal coherence in the definition. The ICC has 
taken steps to answer key questions, such as the meaning of "marriage" in the term 
"forced marriage." It has also set out central elements of forced marriage and key 
indicators that create room for other scenarios in other countries to fit within the label. 
This all represents growth in understanding within international criminal law. How-
ever, given the questions raised by the Taylor Trial Chamber and commentators 
regarding the inter linkages and overlaps between forced marriage and different types 
of enslavement, it cannot yet be said that forced marriage is a settled concept in 
international criminal law. 
174 Raab & Hobbs, supra note 167. 
175 See Annie Bunting, 'Forced Marriage' in Conflict Situations: Researching and Prose-
cuting Old Harms and New Crimes, 1 CAN. J. HUM. RTS. 165 (2012); Raab & Hobbs, supra 
note 167; Sellers, supra note 76, at 142. 
176 Raab & Hobbs, supra note 167 (noting that some victims prefer the label of"enslave-
menf' to socially and legally signal their lack of consent). 
